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Abstract— This paper is focused on the teaching of
engineering ethics (EE). Through a focus on safety and the lens
of what sociologists call the agency/ structure relationship it
examimes various approaches to this teaching. Drawing on
Critical Realism it argues there are deficiencies in both the
dominant approach and a number of proposed alternatives as
they suffer from various forms of conflationism . By drawing on
Critical Realism (CR) a more robust agenda for teaching
engineering ethics can be developed. It is argued that CR offers a
basis for understanding the range of factors which lead to
accidents and disasters. It allows for a fuller consideration of
agency/structure relations and the importance of changing the
contexts in which engineers work in order to allow them to hold
paramount the health, safety and welfare of the public.
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I. INTRODUCTION
This paper is about the teaching of engineering ethics
(EE). Through a focus on safety and the lens of what
sociologists call the agency/ structure (individual/society)
relationship it examimes various approaches to this teaching.
Drawing on Critical Realism [1] it argues there are
deficiencies in both the dominant approach and a number of
proposed alternatives as they suffer from, what Archer has
called, various forms of conflationism [1]. It will also be
argued that by drawing on Critical Realism (CR) a more
robust agenda for teaching engineering ethics can be
developed. The paper proceeds as follows. First the accident at
BP Texas City in 2005 is discussed. It is shown that rather
than being the fault of individuals it resulted from problematic
features of BPs corporate culture and strategy. It is shown that
the accident shares common features with other accidents as
identified in the literature. The question is then posed as to
how engineering students should be taught about such
accidents and what should be the focus of such teaching. It is
argued that the dominant approach, with its emphasis on the
agency of individual engineers, is deficient in that it cannot
adequately address the range of issue identified. It is also
argued that some proposed alternatives do not address these
inadequacies as they focus on structure alone. Finally it is
argued that CR offers a basis for understanding the range of
factors which lead to accidents and disasters. It allows for a
fuller consideration of agency/structure relations and the
importance of changing the contexts in which engineers work
in order to allow them to hold paramount the health, safety
and welfare of the public.

II.

BP TEXAS CITY

On March 23, 2005 fifteen workers were killed and 180
injured in a series of explosions and fires during the start-up of
an isomerisation (ISOM) unit at the third largest refinery in
US owned by BP1. All the dead were contract workers. BP
blamed the blast on “a series of failures” by staff: “Had the
individuals who were operating the facilities and running the
facilities followed the written instructions, the explosion
would not have happened.” Its investigations blamed the
incident on a series of “surprising and deeply disturbing”
mistakes by plant operators and supervisors. BP said company
investigators “didn’t find evidence of budgetary decisions
which were an immediate cause or critical factor in this
terrible tragedy.”
The view of the Chemical Safety Board (CSB) was
somewhat different. Its preliminary report found that highlevel decisions to defer overhauls, cut staff, and rein in costs
contributed to the accident. BP had cut fixed costs by about
25% from 1998 to 2004. These cuts “adversely impacted
maintenance expenditures and infrastructure at the refinery.”
The CSB chairperson said that BP displayed “all the
symptoms of a failed safety culture”: poor maintenance;
inadequate staff training; outdated procedures; malfunctioning
equipment; overworked and over-stretched staff without
adequate supervision. The final CSB report found that the
disaster “was caused by organizational and safety deficiencies
at all levels of the BP Corporation” including inadequate
corporate response to safety problems, ignoring regulations
and a focus on production over safety. BP’s attribution of the
incident to worker error was put in context by the final report
that said these workers had each worked almost 40
consecutive shifts. Such intense working periods are
characteristic of turnaround and maintenance when there is a
major rush to get capital-intensive plants back into operation.
The use of contract workers for maintenance operations
increased the risk of an accident.
An additional problem was that for management “ bad
news was not encouraged, incidents were often ineffectively
investigated and appropriate corrective action not taken.” In
late 2004 consultants were commissioned to survey refinery
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staff on safety. Workers said they had stopped reporting
injuries and incidents, due to pressure from management.
A final issue was that the plant was ineffectively
regulated. The blowdown drum and safety relief valve at the
centre of the incident were undersized: federal regulations
required a study of the relief system, but BP was unable to
produce documents showing this study had actually been
performed: “By 2005 the required relief valve study was 13
years overdue”. The plant had an average of one fire a week
in the ten years leading up to the accident. The CSB was
critical of the regulatory authorities for its minimal regulation
of a large number of hazardous plants. Further, BP had
lobbied against new rules which would have forced it to
upgrade the ISOM unit. Mac Sheoin [2] argues that the
accidents and others like it stem “from common technical,
organizational, and managerial problems, many of which are
directly related to economic decisions”.
What is of significance from the above is the contrast
between BPs explanation focusing on the actions of
individuals and the CSB approach which highlights economic,
organisational and social factors which contributed to the
explosion. Its report accords with research on accidents which
argues that “attempts to find an identifiable culprit (should)
not obscure the more subtle causes of failure which are
typically complex, multiple and rooted in the social and
organisational properties of the overall sociotechnical system
associated with hazardous technology” [4]. These causes recur
in disparate engineering sectors [5].
The factors identified by the CSB report are not
uncommon in other accidents. Dien et al. [6] identify recurrent
features of “organisational accidents”. In doing so they argue
that “the scientific community involved in the field of accident
study agrees on the fact that if any event (accident, incident or
crisis) is generated by direct and immediate causes (“human
errors” among others), it has been induced and favoured by
underlying local causes or conditions (specific technical and
ergonomic conditions, local modes of personnel management,
environmental characteristics, etc.) and more global
organisational conditions which may be at the origin of the
local conditions or have an impact on the direct or immediate
causes (e.g. weak safety culture, primacy of production
pressure, failure or lack of communication between business
entities, technocratic reorganisation, a deteriorating social
climate, etc.).”
Accidents have an historical background and an
unfavourable organisational context in as much as a number of
decisions and unfavourable circumstances progressively
generate a pre-accident situation long before the triggering of
the accident itself. Accidents can be seen to have an
incubation period when multiple predisposing factors
accumulate. A trigger event then provokes the onset of the
accident [4]. The recurrent factors identified by Dien et al. are:
1. Weakness of the organisational safety culture; 2. Complex
and inappropriate organisation; 3. Limits of operational
feedback; 4. Failure of the control organisations; and 5.
Production pressures.

Taking a more radical and integrated approach Tombs
[6,7] offers what he calls a “political economy of corporate
killing.” In explaining “safety crimes” he argues for an
approach based on political economy which places their
production within “prevailing systems of economic, social and
political organisation, dominant value systems and beliefs, and
the differential distribution of power. Grasping the complexity
of safety crimes means addressing a series of inter-related
factors, not least dynamically (that is, historically) and beyond
the level of the nation state”. He argues that there is a need to
consider a range of factors ranging from the individual
through to the structural operating at four analytically distinct
levels. Individuals need to be placed in the structures in which
they operate and this means taking account of their immediate
work group, workplace, company and the wider environment
in which the company operates. This leads to a focus on the
relationship between profit and safety, management and
workers (including the capacity of the latter to organise and
challenge the former and the extent to which management
heed warnings from below), the role of the state in regulating
safety and supporting a “voice” for workers and state business
relations: corporations operate within “particular kinds of
social order with certain legal bases guarantees and powers”.
In this context the advent of neo-liberal regimes with
commitments to deregulation and the valorisation of risk has
had a detrimental effect on workplace safety2. What is
significant about this approach is that it seeks to integrate
mechanisms operating at different levels into explanations of
management and worker interactions and their effects on
safety. It focuses on the distribution of power and “exposes as
socially specific what is taken for granted, revealing how what
is, was not always so, and need not necessarily be, with
existent states of affairs only comprehensible in the context of
macro-level social processes, on both national and
international levels.” [7].
III.

ENGINEERING ETHICS

The above raises a challenge for those seeking to teach EE
and who want to empower engineers to hold paramount the
safety, health and welfare of the public. The dominant
approach [10,11,12,13] to EE uses case studies to focus on the
resolution of ethical dilemmas by individual engineers. These
often involve clashes between engineers and managers and
focus on the capacity of engineers to resist managerial
pressures and/or engage in whistleblowing. The approach
draws on moral philosophy and codes of ethics, “standards of
responsibility” [15], as the basis of ethical decision making.
EE should help “engineers to take their professional
responsibilities to heart” [14]. It assumes that not only can
ethical problems be solved at the level of the individual but
that engineers can act on their solutions. As a result, those
using this approach tend to focus on individual failings as the
key impediments to responsible action [see 15].
In explaining the Challenger Disaster Davis focuses on
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“microscopic vision” and that fact the Lund (an engineer)
stopped thinking like an engineer and more like a manager:
“Lund had a professional duty to act like an engineer…For an
engineer public safety is the paramount consideration. The
engineers could not say the launch would be safe, so, Lund
should have delayed the launch. Seven people died, in part at
least because Lund did not do what, as an engineer, he was
supposed to do” [16]. This explanation seems to ignore the
analysis presented above about the importance of an
incubation period generating a pre-accident situation and the
range of contextual factors that contribute to this and focuses
solely on the individual engineer: “A solid grounding in moral
philosophy, a personal moral code, and a commitment to
professional responsibility are assumed to inoculate us from
the weakness of will” [17]. By ignoring the structural context
in which engineering takes place this approach leads to
moralism as unrealistic expectations are placed on engineers.
One particular problem is what is referred to as the “problem
of many hands” in that engineers are just one of many actors
involved in complex organisational and technical processes.
Further, the freedom of engineers is restricted in that they
typically work in “hierarchical organisations and have little
room to follow their own choices” [17]. This refers to what is
known as the captivity of engineering to corporate and
managerial agendas [18].
A related problem with this approach is its commitment to
value neutrality. While engineers are to practice engineering
ethically they are not to commit to any particular set of values.
Engineers are to strive for “creative middle ground” [15]
solutions and EE teachers are to avoid preaching [19]. There
would seem to be an assumption that not only are creative
middle ground solutions desirable but also that they are
attainable (in that the needs of all parties can be met) and
implementable without addressing the wider context in which
problems arise.. The contexts that underlies cases is not called
into question. Thus this approach does not lead to the
questioning of the wider purpose of engineering or the role of
engineers in reproducing power relations and patterns of
privilege in society. There is a crucial link between the
ontological assumption that EE teaching should focus
narrowly on the practice of individual engineers and the
political assumption that ethical dilemmas can be resolved at
this level without changing the context in which engineers
work. This is why some have called for a focus on institutional
ethics rather than individual ethics. Underlying this work is
the recognition that “If the engineers claim for safety have to
survive in a context dominated by competition for money and
power, regulation with an ethical content may be the engineers
life jacket” [20, see also 21]. This is part of a wider call for
alternative approaches which focus on the realities of
engineering practice, the broad goals of engineering, policy
issues and institutional arrangements which affect the practice
of engineering [22].
IV. PROFESSIONAL AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURES
From the perspective of social ontology and the
agency/structure relationship the traditional approach can be
seen to be overly focused on the agency of engineers. As
already suggested a variety of alternative approaches have

been proposed. Some [23] meet the requirement, as argued for
by Herkert [24], to integrate marco issues into EE by focusing
on the goals of the profession. Drawing from the philosophy
of technology, Son [13] has argued that a shift to a macro
focus,
should lead to a questioning of the goals of engineering or
current forms of technological development. He says that
‘‘…engineers will be obliged to reflect on what kind of
society is desirable, to produce sound arguments for their
ideas, and to conduct and justify their engineering
practices accordingly”. This may lead engineers to
question their involvement in particular engineering
projects and the pace and trajectory of technological
development. While it can be agreed that there is a need to
question current paths of technological development and
the goals and aspirations of engineers this needs to be
accompanied by proposals and strategies for change.
Otherwise we will end up with a purely aspirational ethics
[23] which aspires to the ‘Good Society’ but offers no map
as to how to get there because it does not address the
captive nature of the profession and the tendency of
capitalism to commodify all social relations so that they
become purely instrumental [25]. Raising the level of
analysis to address macro issues and the broader goals of
engineering is not enough unless we address the capacity
of engineers to practice engineering in a way that
promotes safety (and sustainability and social justice).
This means changing the structural context in which they
work. Son argues that this task may be beyond applied
ethics as a whole “because it deals with ethical issues
within existing systems, but does not necessarily try to
change the system itself” [13].
A shift in emphasis would require a more sociological
focus on how the practices of engineers impact on and are
impacted by the social system. But this is not unproblematic.
Davis [26] argues that sociological approaches to EE tend to
make decisions seem inevitable as events are seen as linked by
social forces rather than by individual decisions. And there is
validity to this critique as some forms of sociological
explanation treat humans as oversocialised “cultural dopes”
who merely manifest the demands of their society. If actions
are determined at this level then all ethical issues are diluted as
human resistance and intervention become futile.
There is a tendency to such an approach in the much
praised account of the Challenger Disaster by Vaughan [27].
Her approach is seen by some to offer the basis for a clear
alternative to the focus on dilemmas facing engineers by
focusing on the practice of engineers and the organisational
and cultural context of that practice [17]. In explaining the
disaster she emphasises institutional logics and the manner in
which patterns of behaviour developed and became
institutionalised within the organisations supporting the
Shuttle programme. Vaughan discusses how risk came to be
redefined, leading to the “normalisation of deviance” and a
number of launches with a flawed design. She correctly
highlights the wider economic and political environment in
which NASA operated and the way it contributed to the

normalisation of deviance. Changes in NASA’s budgetary
environment meant that “schedule, budget, following rules and
procedures, and allegiance to hierarchy displaced safety and
deference to the expertise of working engineers” [27]. Thus
she not only focuses on the organisation and work groups but
also the relationship between the culture of the workgroup and
the wider economic and political environment. She is sceptical
about the possibilities for organisational reform which does
not take account of this wider environment.
While being a useful corrective to the focus on individual
engineers this seems to argue for too neat a fit between the
wider culture, the organisational culture and the behaviour of
individuals. Drawing on particular theoretical approaches, new
institutionalism and Bourdieu’s concept of habitus [28], she
tends to emphasis the determining role of social structures at
the expense of human agency. She relies on new
institutionalism to argue that the institutional context gave rise
to a culture of production that led to a defective decision
making process [29]. Her use of this approach leads to an
emphasis on the integrating role of the organisational culture:
the stress is on the unreflective and routine. The taken-for
granted and unreflective nature of action is reinforced by her
use of habitus to demonstrate how the institutional forces in
the organisational environment become embodied in the
actions of the engineers. Proponents of new institutionalism
have seen it as a key concept for linking macro social forces to
behaviour to explain how “actors chronically reproduce and
acquiesce to social structures that are not in their interest”
[30]. This would seem to leave little room for human
reflection and intentionality and little possibility for change.
It is no surprise then that Freeland [31] claims that
Vaughan veers too far towards an “oversocialised” conception
of action “in which actors passively reproduce learned cultural
scripts”. A key criticism of her account is in focusing on the
institutional culture she neglects the issue of power: “she
replaces the study of conflict with a notion of totalising and
unconscious institutional forces” [29, see also 33]. In fact the
launch decision, which led to the disaster, took place under
unprecedented cold conditions outside parameters that had not
been previously investigated. Thus it was not normal. If
universal macro forces were dominant disagreement could not
have arisen. The launch was opposed by a group of engineers
who knew it was outside normal parameters, rather than being
embedded in an unquestioned culture [32]. In effect she is
offering a particular kind of sociological explanation, with the
emphasis on the organisational culture, which does not take
adequate account of the capacity of people to challenge
dominant cultural scripts and the social relations which
provide differential access to power and resources.
It is worth noting at this point that both the traditional
approach and that of Vaughan are both politically
problematical in that in focusing, on the one hand, on
decontextualised individuals and, on the other, the allencompassing power of institutional logics, they either do not
see the need for institutional change or render engineers
powerless in bringing about change. Either there is no need for
change or no chance of bringing it about. In attempting to

build on Vaughan’s approach, and in focusing on
organisational culture, Lynch and Kline do not overcome this
problem.
They want to assert the possibility for the
imaginative prevention of the “normalisation of deviance” at
the workplace. They aim “to explore how engineers can learn
to identify features of their everyday practice that potentially
contributes to ethically problematic outcomes before clear-cut
ethical dilemmas emerge”. Their approach to accident
prevention remains focused on the moral responsibility of
engineers and less on the changing the institutional
environment in which they work [10]. This is despite Vaughan
paying considerable attention to the wider economic and
political environment in which NASA operated and the way it
reinforced the normalisation of deviance.
Lynch and Kline’s focus is on the organisational culture
and they fail to adequately specify how engineers who become
aware of the normalisation of deviance are to change
organisational practice. They dismiss those who consider the
role that engineering professional bodies, codes of ethics,
trade unions, lawyers and regulatory agencies can play in
bolstering responses to safety issues. In considering Lynch
and Kline’s approach Swierstra and Jelsma [14], argue that in
“modern technology projects” the necessary conditions for
individual moral agency are lacking and that the picture
painted by Lynch and Kline is far too rosy. They call for a
sociologically informed way of studying engineering practice,
endorse the call for “an institutional ethics” and a focus on the
relationship between individual moral agency on the one hand
and the individual’s enabling and constraining environment on
the other.
V. CRITICAL REALISM (CR)
Vaughan offers one way of understanding this relationship
with the emphasis of the determining and constraining effect
of the institutional environment. Recognising the deficiencies
of such an approach CR seeks to provide an account of the
agency structure relationship which takes account of a
properly argued view of both and the relationship between
them [34]. CR argues for the primacy of ontology and that
“the social ontology endorsed … conceptualises social reality
in certain terms, thus identifying what there is to be
explained”[1]. Thus what society is held to be, including how
we understand the relationship between structure and action,
affects what constitutes “explanatory purchase on substantive
social problems”.
In seeking to explain social phenomena CR offers a
distinctive approach [36]. Two issues are important for the
purposes of this paper. Firstly, CR offers a depth ontology: a
notion of a stratified reality which includes a distinction
between the domain of the real (generative mechanisms), the
actual (events) and the empirical (experiences). Structures of
objects at the level of the real generate mechanisms that
facilitate events. CR focuses on the identification of these
mechanisms as causal factors explaining social phenomena.
This is potentially emancipatory in that it forces us to consider
“that certain states of affairs cannot be ameliorated within
existing structures”. [37]. They must be changed.

Secondly, structures are described as generative
mechanisms, because when their powers are realised they
work to make things happen. Their activation is dependent on
human agents. CR is committed to an explanatory model “in
which the interplay between pre-existent structures, possessing
causal powers…and people possessing causal powers…of
their own results in contingent yet explicable outcomes” [36].
Thus any investigation can only take place at the intersection
of agential and structural objects. Archer [1] argues that social
theory has proposed unsatisfactory ways to understand this
relationship and provides a framework for understanding
different approaches by focusing on what she calls varieties of
conflationism. On the one hand there is downward conflation
which emphasis the determining effect of social structures and
allows very little role for intentional human activity in
explaining social forms. On the other hand there is upward
conflation which places undue emphasis on the creative and
intentional dimension of human activity and downplays the
way human beings are “constrained by the way society is
constructed” [34]. She identifies a third kind of central
conflationism which see agency and structure as “mutually
constitutive” and fundamentally inseparable. Structures are
instantiated in social practices and are not seen as constituting
externalised entities that constrain agency in various ways.
Thus structure is collapsed into agency and their properties
cannot be examined separately.
What CR seeks to do is to avoid these positions and to take
account of a properly argued view of both and the relationship
between them. CR is committed to analytical dualism in that
structure and agency are seen as objects of a distinct type
possessing different properties and powers. For the latter
these include self-consciousness, reflexivity, intentionality,
cognition and emotionality. The key properties of social
structures are anteriority (they are pre-existing features of the
world we are born into) and that they are relatively enduring.
Among the powers possessed by social structures are those of
enablement and constraint.
One consequence of this is that actors are capable of
reflection and can formulate commitments and develop
normative projects as a consequence of their deliberations
upon their social situation. But we do not do this in
circumstances of our own choosing: “People choose what they
do, but they make their choices from a structurally and
culturally determined range of options – which they do not
choose” [36]. As seen above structures predates agency.
While structure are dependent on activity those actions that
produce a given structure may be those of a past generation.
Therefore the relationship between agency and structure has to
be examined over time. Once these differential temporalities
of structure and agency are taken into account the close bond
between the two, as argued for by central conflationists, is
loosened and it becomes necessary to differentiate the two and
examine their interplay. In order to do so, Archer has proposed
her morphogenetic model of explanation which works on the
basis of a three part cycle of analysis:
a) Structural conditioning: pre-existence structures as
generative mechanisms that condition but do not determine;

b) Social interaction: their interplay with other objects
including agents possessing causal powers leading to
c) Structural elaboration or modification: non-predictable
but explicable outcomes arising from the interactions between
the above.
The model allows us to focus on the interplay between
structure and agency and the possibility of change arising from
social interactions. This arises because agents can reflect on
their situation and formulate projects for change and structures
can provide them with the power to carry them through. Thus
transformation is dependent both on a commitment to change
and a supportive social context.
VI. CR AND ETHICS EDUCATION
From the perspective of EE education this approach would
seem to have a number of advantages. It avoids the
conflationism evidenced in the approaches to EE outlined
above. The traditional approach, and also that of Lynch and
Kline, are forms of upward conflationism as they focus on the
agency of engineers while the analysis of Vaughan suffers
from downward conflationism in emphasising the determining
effects of the institutional culture.
It can be noted also that while some have called for a
greater integration of Science and Technology Studies (STS)
into the study of EE [38] it has been argued that approaches to
understanding technology and organisations associated with
STS are characterised by a flat ontology associated with
central conflationism and pay inadequate attention to the need
to distinguish between different levels or forms of analysis.
They tend to focus on the domain of the empirical and the
processal character of social reality [39,40,41]. Law [42]
claims that “this position is implied in the ANT (Actor
Network Theory) refusal to use contextual arguments about
‘social shaping’ to explain the unfolding of socio-technical
networks. ANT authors tend to argue that social, political,
economic contexts are mobilised and enacted together with
technical or scientific ‘content’. The former do not shape the
latter”. Applying this to engineering practice he suggests we
should seek to improve “the character of that practice…rather
than discovering the operation of undermining external
forces”. But if we cannot analytically distinguish between the
context and content or practice then it is impossible to
understand how the social world shapes that practice and
enables or constrains the actions of engineers. The ontological
status and explanatory power of structure is lost [41].
CR encourages us to examine ethical issues in a manner
which focus underlying generative mechanisms, the
interactions between them and their impacts on engineering
practice over time. It “forces us to look at deeper structural
things that might be the cause of events” [35] like the
underlying organisational, economic and political factors
identified in the discussion of accidents above. But it also
encourages us to consider the capacity of engineers (as social
agents) to influence organisational practices. In this context a
key issue is the extent to which dominant views are
contestable [32] and the manner in which engineers are

enabled to contest dominant views and promote change. Thus
the promotion of an institutional ethics is useful, but does not
resolve all issues in that regulation has to be fought for and
implemented [20]. Therefore CR provides a theoretical basis
for placing second order responsibilities on engineers to strive
for the creation of supportive social environments which
enable their social responsibility [10]. Arising from this we are
required to examine the interventions of engineers in the
public policy domain and how they contribute to the
structural conditioning of engineering practice and whether
the resulting laws, regulation and practices contribute to
structural elaboration or modification. By focusing on the
interaction of agential and structural objects CR avoids the
moralism of the traditional approach and the determinism of
those who argue for the overarching influence of
organisational culture in explaining accidents and disasters.By
attempting to identify the structural and material preconditions
for successful interventions in the world a CR approach can
put us in a better position to identify impediments to change at
the level of the real and address underlying causes of
phenomena such as accidents. One outcome of this may be a
more effective approach to accident prevention.
VII. - CONCLUSIONS
This paper has argued that there are deficiencies in the
dominant approach to engineering ethics and some proposed
alternatives. A more adequate approach can draw on CR to
shift the emphasis from the teaching of moral reasoning and a
narrow focus on values and attitudes to a concern with the
integration into engineering programmes of the social and
institutional context of engineers work and the role of
engineers in promoting policy changes and social practices
that change these social contexts and enable social
responsibility [see 43]. This should force us to ask our
students to consider what alternative models of engineering
practice are available other than those located within profit
driven and hierarchically organised corporations [7, 22]. This
would require a focus on the use of history, politics,
organisation and social theory in engineering programmes and
may move us far from teaching ethics as traditionally
understood and to a greater focus on social policy. This may
raise the question as to whether all those apparently engaged
in teaching engineering ethics are actually involved in the
same enterprise as the emphasis shifts from moral decision
making to concerns about the social context in which
engineering takes place [44]. But surely this is a less
interesting question than one that focuses on what is actually
required in engineering education to enable future engineers to
understand the full range of issues they will be required to
address in order hold paramount the health, safety and welfare
of the public.
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